EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
With the
dispute between Georgia and Russia
in a new, dangerously
confrontational phase, the risk of
war in the South Caucasus is growing.
Concerned by NATO’s plans for
further extension to former Soviet
republics and Kosovo’s unilateral
but Western-orchestrated
independence, Russia has stepped up
manipulation of the South Ossetia
and Abkhazia conflicts. Georgia
remains determined to restore its
territorial integrity, and hawks in
Tbilisi are seriously considering a
military option. Both sides need to
recognise the risks in current
policies, cool their rhetoric and
cease military preparations. Russia
should cease undermining its
peacekeeper and mediator roles and
be open to a change of negotiating
formats. Georgia should adopt a new
approach to the Abkhaz, encouraging
their links to the outside world to
lessen dependence on Russia and
emphasising incremental confidence
building to establish the mutual
trust needed for successful
negotiations. The U.S. and European
Union (EU) should be firm and united
in cautioning both Moscow and
Tbilisi against military adventures.
Moscow
deployed additional troops and
military hardware, allegedly in
furtherance of its peacekeeping
mandate, to Georgia’s breakaway
territory of Abkhazia in April 2008,
thus continuing a pattern of
escalating tensions. This includes
former President Vladimir Putin’s
announcement that Russia would
formalise ties with Abkhazia and
statements by Kremlin officials that
Moscow was prepared to use military
force to protect its citizens in
Abkhazia and South Ossetia if
hostilities resumed. How close to
that kind of conflict the region may
be is suggested by a series of
incidents in which unmanned Georgian
aircraft have been shot down over
Abkhazia, at least once by a Russian
jet.
Tbilisi
has responded with a diplomatic
offensive, enlisting high-level
Western political support, while
repeating that it wants to resolve
the frozen conflicts peacefully. It
shares blame for the escalation,
however. It has quietly been making
military preparations, particularly
in western Georgia and Upper Kodori.
A number of powerful advisers and
structures around President Mikheil
Saakashvili appear increasingly
convinced a military operation in
Abkhazia is feasible and necessary.
The option they seem to favour would
aim at regaining control of the
southern part of the territory so as
to establish at least a temporary
partition. The Georgians have been
warned by their Western partners
against attempting a military
solution. But there are strong
feelings in Tbilisi that something
must be done to change a status quo
in which Russia challenges the
country’s sovereignty with virtual
impunity. The risk of miscalculation
by either side leading to unintended
fighting is also serious.
The
Abkhaz themselves fear that they
will be the biggest losers in the
Moscow-Tbilisi dispute. Russia has
been their sole support as they have
sought to break away from Georgian
rule, but there is little likelihood
Moscow would ever formally recognise
their independence. Instead, the
Abkhaz find themselves being used
for purposes having little to do
with their own cause and in danger
of being absorbed as a small
minority into the giant Russian
Federation. That realisation is
sinking in and could provide the
basis for new, more promising
Tbilisi-Sukhumi talks.
The
Georgian government says it wants to
move in that direction, but there
has been too little realism and too
many mixed messages in its language
to date. President Saakashvili
offered a new peace plan for
Abkhazia in March, with extensive
autonomy, a jointly controlled
economic zone and gradual merger of
law enforcement and customs agencies.
If this initiative is not to be
stillborn, however, the Georgians
will need to take steps to persuade
the Abkhaz that it is not meant
primarily to satisfy Western
partners, and they are serious about
restarting a meaningful negotiating
process. This requires an immediate
end to bellicose rhetoric,
postponement of efforts to settle
the ultimate status question and a
newly consistent focus on confidence
building. While Georgia’s desire to
change the negotiations format,
currently mediated by Russia, is
understandable, it should not make
this a precondition for resuming
talks.
The West
must meanwhile use all its influence
to press for peaceful resolution of
the Georgian-Abkhaz and Georgian-Russian
conflicts alike. Persuading Russia
to withdraw any troops and equipment
from Abkhazia which do not fit with
its peacekeeping mandate from the
Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS) would improve the environment
for diplomatic progress. The 5-6
June visit of foreign policy chief
Javier Solana to Tbilisi and Sukhumi
is an opportunity for the EU to show
unity and resolve, as well as listen
to the sides’ grievances. The U.S.
and EU should also be unequivocal
about the negative impact that a
conflict in Abkhazia would have on
the 2014 Sochi Olympics. At the same
time, they should show they are
aware of Russia’s legitimate
interests in the Caucasus and
concerns for the stability of its
own southern regions, and should
unmistakably communicate to Georgia
that any rash moves would have
negative consequences for its NATO
ambitions as well as foreign
investment.
1.
Refrain from hostile actions and
confrontational rhetoric, while
respecting the 1994 Moscow
Agreement and relevant UN Security
Council Resolutions and CIS
decisions regulating the ceasefire
regime, separation of forces and
deployment of peacekeeping troops in
Abkhazia.
2..
Resume negotiations, focusing on
confidence building first rather
than status issues, and agree on
changes to the negotiations format
that emphasise direct Georgian-Abkhaz
dialogue and give the EU a role on a
par with Russia and the UN.
3. Halt
any preparations for a military
operation as well as belligerent
rhetoric (including false press
reports), and be transparent with
regard to military and internal
affairs ministry budgets and
acquisitions.
4. Show
respect for the Abkhaz self-determination
aspirations and security fears,
including by issuing a statement
regretting past injustices.
5.
Pursue and consistently implement
without status preconditions
measures designed to build
confidence over time, such as a free
trade zone along both sides of the
ceasefire line and steps to allow
the Abkhaz to develop ties beyond
Russia, including the removal of
sanctions and reopening of airport,
railroad and seaport links.
6. Keep
the Upper Kodori Gorge free of
military presence and activity,
provide full information on the
security presence there and refrain
from overflights of Abkhazia,
including by unmanned aircraft.
7.
Commit formally and without
preconditions to non-resumption of
hostilities.
8.
Sukhumi should carry out more
measures to support sustainable
returns, and both sides should cease
harassment of Gali returnees and
agree on a returns verification
exercise for the Gali district by
the UN High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR).
9.
Refrain from all actions that
undermine Georgia’s sovereignty and
Russia’s role as an impartial
mediator and peacekeeper, including
unilateral upgrading of ties with de
facto authorities in Abkhazia.
10.
Withdraw troops and equipment
introduced into Abkhazia on 29 April
and 31 May 2008 and ensure that the
number, equipment and activities of
CIS peacekeepers deployed there is
consistent with relevant CIS rules.
11.
Make more effective use of the NATO-Russia
Council, especially as a forum to
discuss NATO enlargement to Georgia
and Ukraine, including Russian
concerns.
12.
Call on all sides to refrain from
hostilities and return to
negotiations, while emphasising the
negative consequences if conflict
erupts, including for Georgia’s
integration into Euro-Atlantic
structures and for Russia’s plans to
host successful Winter Olympics in
2014.
13. The
EU should promptly implement
European Commission confidence-building
measures, including speeding up the
opening of EU information centres in
the conflict regions.
Tbilisi/Moscow/Brussels, 5 June 2008